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Neither the right of traveling upon the ice of a river affected by the tide,
nor tile right of taking ice therefrom, is an absolute property right in any
person. Both are natural or common rights, belonging to the public at large.
Though such rights are theoretically open to all, those persons who first take
possession of them are entitled to their enjoyment without interference from
others, such rights being the subjects of qualified property by occupation.
Each right is relative or comparative, and, when conflicting with the exercise of the other right, is itself to be exercised reasonably. What would be
a reasonable exercise of the one or the other, at any particular place, must
depend largely upon the benefits which the people at large are to receive therefrom.
The right of passage over the ice for general travel is not the paramount
right at such a place as the Penobscot river at Bangor, and for some distance
below, where the great body of the ice is annually harvested for the purposes
of domestic and foreign trade; the-traveler's privilege at such place being of
trifling consequence, compared with other interests conflicting with it, and
beset with difficulty and danger during the ice-cutting season.
It is the duty of those who appropriate to their use portions of a public
river for ice-fields to so guard their fields, after they have been cut into, as not
to expose to danger any persons who may innocently intrude upon them.
Although the defendant may have been in fault in leaving his ice-field
unprotected against accident, yet, where the plaintiff's servant, knowing the
customs of ice-gatherers, willfully left the usual driven track, and drove over
a bank of snow by the side of tie defendant's ice-field, knowing that he was
going upon an ice-field, and that it was dangerous to do so, he was guilty of
contributory negligence, and the plaintiff cannot recover for injuries to his
property.

0N motion by defendants from Supreme Judicial Court, Penobscot county.
Action on the case to recover damages to plaintiff's property because ot alleged negligence of defendants. The verdict
was in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants filed a motion
for new trial. The opinion states the material facts.
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.P. Stetson, for plaintiff.
Wilson & Woodward, for defendants.
PETERS, C. J.-This case largely depends for its solution upon
what may be the extent of the right to harvest ice from our
large rivers, compared with the conflicting right of traveling
upon such rivers during the winter season. This is an interesting topic of inquiry, in view of the importance which ice has
lately assumed as a merchantable commodity, and is a branch
upon which the law has as yet hardly passed beyond a formative
period. The inexhaustible and ever-changing complications in
human affairs are constantly presenting new questions and new
conditions which the law must provide for as they arise; and
the law has expansive and adaptive force enough to respond to
the demands thus made of it, not by subverting, but by forming
new combinations and making new applications out of its already established principlcs,-tle result produced being only
"the new corn that cometh out of the old fields."
Neither of the rights which seem in conflict in the present
case, that of harvesting ice and that of traveling upon the ice,
is absolute in any person. No one has any absolute property in
either. They are derived from a natural right which all have,
to enjoy the benefit of the elements, such as air, light, and water,
and are common or public rights, which belong to the whole
community. In the Roman law they were classified as "imperfect rights." Not that all persons can or do enjoy the boon alike.
Much depends upon first appropriation. One man's possession
may exclude others from it. Says Blackstone (2 Comm. 14):
"These things, so long as they remain in possession, every man
has a right to enjoy without disturbance ; but if once they escape
from his custody, or he voluntarily abandons the use of them,
they return to the common stock, and any man else has an equal
right to seize and enjoy them afterward." They are the subjects of qualified property by occupation: 2 Kent, Comm. 348.
Each right is in theory, speaking generally, relative or comparative. Each recognizes other rights that may come in its
way. Each must be exercised reasonably. And what would be
a reasonable exercise of the one or the other, at any particular
place (for, clearly, there would be a difference in the relative
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importance of the different rights in different localities), depends
in a large degree upon the benefits which the community derive
therefrom. The public wants and necessities are to be considered.
The two kinds of franchise belong to the people at large, are
owned in common, and the common good of all must have a
decisive weight on the question of individual enjoyment.
These, and all other public rights, and the relation that shall
subsist between them, when not thereby trenching upon congressional jurisdiction, may be regulated by the legislature.
The legislature is the trustee of the public rights for the people.
And, as such agent or trustee, the legislature of this State has
gone a great way in abridging an individual enjoyment of some
of the common rights and privileges possessed by society, when
the legislation has presumably inured to the common good. It
authorized the changing of the channel of the Saco river, although the effect of the diversion was to impair the value of a
good deal of private property (Spring v. Russell, 7 Me. 273);
has allowed private interest to be subserved to the injury of
other private interests, by permitting dams and mills to be erected which prevented the flow and ebb of the tide, upon the ground
that tle public as a whole were to be benefited thereby (Parker
v. Cutler Hill-Dan Co., 20 Mle. 353) ; has granted to asingleindividual, the exclusive right of navigating Penobscot river above
the tide with steamers, for a period of 20 years, for the consideration of improvements to be made in the navigation of the
river by the grantee (Jloor v. Veazie, 31 Mle. 360 ; 32 Id. 343 ;
14 How. 568). These are illustrations of the legislative power
in such matters.
The legislature has the constitutional authority, no doubt, to
provide rules regulating the possession and cultivation of the
ice-fields upon our navigable rivers, where the tide ebbs and
flows, at all events so far as the business is carried on below
low-water line, and for the adjustment of conflicting interests
which may affect that privilege. If it omits to do so, such
matters necessarily become the subjects of judicial interpretation. 'While the judicial is not co-extensive with the legislative
jurisdiction upon the questions, there can be no doubt that it is
within the scope of judicial authority to determine the manner
in which such public privileges may be best enjoyed by the
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public, provided that any judicial regulation which may be attempted shall do no violence to exist;ng law.
The law is subject to slow and gradual groath. A remarkable instance of the development of the law is seen in the doctrine unanimously adopted by the courts in this country that a
river may be considered navigable although not affected by a
flow of tile tides from the sea. The common law was otherwise. Lord Hale, the great publicist, knew no such doctrine.
Legislation did not create it. The courts felt obliged to adopt
the interpretation, as a new application of an old rule, from an
irresistible public necessity. The court of no State has probably ventured so far as this court has in maintaining that small
streams have floatable properties belonging to the public use.
Our climate and forests, together with the interests and wants
of the community make the doctrine here reasonable,-a reasonable interpretation of the law; while in some of the States,
where less necessity for the doctrine exists, it is considered by
their courts to be untenable, as subversive of private rights.
So, in handling the somewhat novel and important questions
now pending before us, we are certainly at liberty to construct
out of admitted legal principles such reasonable rules as will
meet the requirements of the case.
The importance to the public of the ice privileges within the
territory before named is incomparably greater than is that of
traveling on the ice. Winter river-roads are of much less consequence at the present day than formerly. In the earlier days the
natural ways were the only ways for travel, and upon the large
ponds and lakes, and upon the rivers in remote places, tie same
necessity may even now exist. But at Bangor, and for some
distance below, the principal area of Penobscot river from which
the ice-cuttings have been for some years customarily taken,
the public have no need of a way on the ice. The traveler receives much more than au equivalent for any deprivation of
the natural passage, in the use of the roads on the banks of the
river, at all times kept pasable at the public expense. Roads
over the ice are rarely suitable and passable,-only occasionally
so. The access to them from the shores is difficult, if not dangerous, where the tide, as it does here, ebbs and flows. Permission must be had of the riparian proprietor to cross his
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land to enable one to get to the river without being a trespasser.
The inconveniences render the privilege nearly, if not quite,
worthless. Nor is any considerable use of the river for such
purpose proved or suggested. On the other hand, the business
of gathering ice for merchantable purposes has assumed extraordinary importance on our rivers. Large amounts of capital
are invested. Thousands of men and of teams are employed at
a season of the year when other employment cannot be obtained
by them. The outlay is mostly in bills for labor, widely circulated. A crop of immense value is annually produced from
an exhaustless soil without sowing. The shipping business is
materially aided by it. The wealth of the State is greatly increased by it. It is eminently a business of the people. It
would seem unreasonable to embarrass such an important enterprise by according to the traveling public a paramount right of
passage, when such right, even to its possessor, is scarcely good
for anything.
It is an error, we think, to invest the right of passing on the
ice in all places with the same degree of importance as that
which attaches to the right of vessels in navigable waters. It
may be an offshoot of the navigable right,-something akin to
it,--but a right of a secondary or inferior degree. The idea of
roads over the frozen surface of rivers was never broached in
the old common law. It has grown up since, and should be
the superior right or not, according to circumstances.
We
know of only one judicial decision touching the subject,-that
in our own State (French v. Canp, 18 Alc. 433), and that does
not contradict the views we express in this discussion. There
the plaintiff's injury came from the defendant's carelessness in
cutting a hole through the ice, and leaving it exposed, upon or
near a place where there had been a winter road for more than
20 years. WYESTO-, C. J., there says: "Assuming that the defendant has as good a right to the use of the water as the plaintiff or the public generally had to the right of passage, the use of
a common privilege should be such as may be most beneficial
and least injurious to all who have occasion to avail themselves
of it." In the present case, it must be remembered, the defendants are not defending themselves a- riparian owners, for
that would justify their possession only to low-water line, but
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as a portion of the public, partaking of a common and public
right: Brastow v. Rookport lee Co., 77 Me. 100.
An unlawful obstruction to navigation, being a common
nuisance, is remedial by indictment, or by abatement; or a court
of equity may take jurisdiction upon all information filed by an
attorney-general:
Gould, Waters, § 121.
It would seem
stranre to see the ice-harvesters accused of nuisance. But nuisauce exists, in lawfil business, only where actual injury is sustained. It must be some essential injury and damage. "People living in cities and large towns must submit to some annoyance, to some inconvenience, to some injury and damage; must
even yield a portion of their rights to the necessities of business :" Wood, Nuis. 11. In an English case it was said:
"Where great works are carried on, which are the means of
developing the national wealth, persons must not stand upon
extreme rights, and bring actions for every petty annoyance :"
St. Helen Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 785; reported in 116 E. C. L. 1093. In Rhodes v. Ois, 33 Ala. 578,
a much-quoted case, the test of the floatability of a stream was
held to be whether fit for valuable floatage and useful to important public interests.
In 1ethersfield v. Humphrey, 20
Conn. 218, it was held that, in order to make a stream navigable, "tthere must be some commerce and navigation upon it
which is essentially valuable." Same decision in Town of Groton
v. HTarlburt, 22 Conn. 178. Navigators must endure inconveniences for the greater general good: Brown v. Town of Preston, 38 Conn. 219. To constitute a nuisance, the obstructions
must materially interrupt general navigation : State v. Wilson,
42 Mle. 9. In Rowe v. Granite Bridge Co., 21 Pick. 344, 347,
SHAW, C. J., said: "But, in order to have this character, it
must be navigable to some purpose useful to trade or agriculture." In Attorney-General v. Roods, 108 Mass. 436, it is
said that this language is applied to the capacity of the stream
rather than to its uses. But the last was a case where the officers of the commonwealth were endeavoring to prevent an act
supposed to injuriously affect the harbor of Boston.
It is our opinion that any occupation of the Penobscot river,
within the limits now receiving our attention, for the purpose of
a winter-way, would be, at this day, of such insignificant im-
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portance, so useless, and valueless, in comparison with other public interests, that it cannot be set up to prevent or abridge the
taking of ice within those limits to any extent whatever.
We do not, however, apply the rule stated to any place where
a way is commonly used across the river, connecting town or
county roads, or where a ferry is established by law: Rev. St.
c. 20, § 7. The traveler's right, even if existing theoretically,
does not, under the circumstances, assert itself. Reasonable use
is practically no use. The same public, possessing both rightsi
prefer to abandon the use of the one for the much more valuable
use of the other.
We are aware that the law, in facilitating the enjoyment of
public rights,-and no private right is involved in this controversy,-scans closely the grounds upon which it admits the
advantage of one person to be set off against the disadvantage of
another. In an early English case (Rex v. Russell, 6 Barn. &
C. 566) an extreme rule was promulgated, in later eases not fully
assented to, that staiths erected in the river Tyne should not be
regarded as a public nuisance, if the public benefit produced by
them countervailed the prejudice done to individuals; the supposed public benefit being that, in consequence of the erections,
coals would be brought to the London market in better condition
or for lesser price. In subsequent cases it has been maintained
that the benefit to be derived from tolerating any impairment of
the navigable convenience must be direct, and that the staiths in
the Tyne, were a remote and indirect benefit merely, and not
computable as a public benefit in the sense of the term in which
it should be used when considering the question of nuisance;
and it has been explained that the benefit must be a public benefit to the same public; that the same public, or some part of
the public, which suffers the inconvenience, must also receive
the benefit; that it must be both beneficial and injurious to the
public using the same waters.
A satisfactory explanation of the doctrine appears in a discussion by JESSEL, Al. R., in Attorney- Gene'alv. Terry, L. R.
9 Ch. 423, where he says: "Then it nmay be asked, what is the
public benefit? In my view it is a benefit of a similar nature,
showing that, on a balance of convenience and inconvenience,
the public at that place not only lose nothing but gain someVoL. XXXVI.-31
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thing by the erection." In that case it was decided that any
benefit in the way of gaining trade, to a single individual erecting a wharf in navigable waters, was too remote to be held to
be for the advantage of the public generally, when the channel
intruded upon was so narrow that every foot of it was wanted
for navigation. In the opinion, an illustration of public benefit
is given, by supposing the piers of a bridge to be placed in the
middle of a navigable river, thereby "to some extent, to a more
or less material extent, obstructing the navigation ;" but the
necessity is great and the injury trifling. In that case, says the
opinion, "it would be a benefit that would counterbalance the
public injury."
Applying the doctrine as carefully as it is guarded in the
cases most widely differing from the case of Rae v. Russdl,
above cited, we feel assured that our conclusions are correct in
sustaining the contention of the present defendants. Here the
ice-gatherer and the traveler belong to the same public; have
presumably interests alike ; were using the same river,-the
same waters,-though in different ways. The ice-takers were
occupying the river under the natural right of dipping water
therefrom, and it is as if thousands of men were simultaneously
exercising the right together. The enterprise directly fosters
the interests of navigation on the river. On the other hand, as
we have before said, the right of travel, so far as pertaining to
the navigation of the river, is, under the circumstances, at most,
a secondary, theoretical right, and of no real and essential value.
Even private property may be taken for public use by affording
compensation. Here, if the traveler is not allowed the use of
the river, it is because more than compensation is supplied to
him in other roads provided for his use.
We think the trial was conducted upon a too literal application of the principles which govern the use of navigable streams,
and that the jury were thereby prejudiced against the defendants
to their injury. These views being accepted, it necessarily follows that this portion of the river should be considered as virtually closed during the winter against general traveling. The
whole tract cut over must be constantly beset with danger
to a traveler who does not keep up an especial acquaintance
with the condition of the ice. Besides, the ice-fields, after they
have been staked and fenced and scraped, and in some instances
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connecting fields extend across the river, have so li become the
property of the appropriator that an action would lie against
one who disturbs his possession: Peoplc's Ice Ob. v. Die E.rcelsior, 44 Mich. 229.
At the same time the appropriators should, by suitable means,
reasonably guard their fields against exposing to danger persons
who may be likely to innocently intrude upon them, if such
likelihood may be seen to exist. It is not necessary, in the
present case, to inquire whether the defendants sufficiently observed such caution or not, inasmuch as we are clearly of the
belief that the plaintiff's servant in charge of his team was
guilty of an act of carelessness which caused the plaintiff's loss.
Even if the defendants were in fault, their delinquency would
be a prior act, while the servant's was a subsequent, distinct,
independent act. The defendants had no reason to suppose the
servant would go in the direction he did, or be heedless in his
course if he were to go there. As some judge said: "One man
is not required to take another man's discretion in his keeping."
At all events, the defendants' act or omission was not negligence against the plaintiff; not an act which the plaintiff can
complain of. The idea is clearly expressed in 2 Law 11ev. &
Quar. J. 507 : "The party who last has a clear opportunity of
avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his
opponent, is considered solely responsible for it." In such case
defendants are not even guilty of contributory negligence; that
is, their negligence does not, in a legal sense, contril)ute to it, or
participate in it. It is merely a passive agency, or condition or
situation through or by which the accident happened; hilt no
part of its real and controlling cause: O'Brien v. LIcGlinchy,
68 MIe. 552, 557.
The servant was hardly even a traveler on the river, in the
ordinary sense of the term. Ile was himself an operative at
the ice-fields, lie came with his team upon the ice by crossing
defendants' land, striking a traveled way which led upon the
ice, along the shore, up to the field of operations lie was to
engage in. From a freak of his own, instead of keeping the
road, as properly lie should, he crossed one of d-f4endants' fields,
as properly he should not; and, while attempting to go across
or around another field of theirs, his team broke through the ice
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and was lost. The pretense is set up that the defendants had
no fence as a protective barrier at the end of the field extremest
froi the west bank of the river, to prevent the traveler from
going upon the thin ice. None was needed. The exercise of
ordinary care by the servant was all that was needed. There
was a large ridge of snow and ice at the easterly end of the
field, sEveral feet high, thrown up by scraping the field from
west to east in preparation for ice-cutting. It seems that the ice
was left uncut and solid for a space of twelve or fifteen feet in
width inside of the piles or ridge, in order to afford space wide
enough for a pair of horses to travel upon while cutting out
and handling the cakes of ice. It is a risky track for any
horses, but what dangers there are upon the track are incidental
to the business. The servant confesses that lie was acquainted
with the mode of the business; that lie knew that the ice had
been scraped up to the ridge of snow ; knew that there might
be holes and thin ice where the field had been scraped ; knew
that lie was going upon the scraped ice; and still lie recklessly
undertook to conduct his team on the inside of the ridge, when
there was an abundance of room to drive safely outside of it.
By his carelessness, for which there seems to be no rational explanation, the plaintiff's property was lost.
Motion sustained.
WALTON, DANFORTH, VIRGIN, LIBBEY and FOSTER, JJ.,
concurred.
HASKELL, J., concurred in the result, but not in the reasoning by which it was reached.
There are not many cases strictly
analogous to the principal case. There
are, however, many decisions arising
out of the business of gathering,
manufacturing or selling ice, which
we have collated. French v. Camp,
18 Me. 433, is perhaps the only authority similar to the principal case.
It was held in that case, that all have
a right to travel on a public river
upon the ice and if any one cuts
ice upon or near the place where
there has been a winter way for twenty
years, he is liable to the paymnt of

all damages thereby sustained, by
those traveling upon such way, without carelessness or fault on their part.
WEsToN, C. J., said, "It is a matter
of general notoriety, that in all the
settled parts of the State, public rivers
and streams, not broken by falls or
rapids, are traversed up and down,
upon the ice, in such well marked and
beaten ways as are most convenient
for the public. They are not proper
subjects for the application of the
statute laws provided for the location
of public roads or highways: nor are
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they susceptible of being governed by
the rules and principles by which
easements of this kind may be otherwise acquired on land. Yet we do
not hesitate to regard them as public
rights, so far under legal protection
as to entitle a party to a civil remedy,
who is wantonly and unnecessarily
disturbed by others while attempting
to participate in their enjoyment."
The Riglid of Gathering Icefiom
Ponds.-"Great Ponds," in Massachusetts containing more than ten
acres, which were not, before the
year 1647, appropriated to private
persons were by the colony ordinance
declared to be subject to common
public use. Fishing, fowling, boating,
bathing, skating or riding, upon the
ice, taking water for domestic or agricultural purposes or for use in the
arts, and the cutting and taking of
ice, are lawful and free upon these
ponds to all persons who own land
adjoining them or can obtain access
to them without trespass, s_ far as
they do not interfere with the reasonable use of the ponds by others or
with the public right, except in cases
where the legislature has otherwise
directed: InhabitaLs of IVest Roxbury
v. Stddxrd, 7 Allen, 158. This right
cannot be conveyed, by deed of an
owner of land on the shore of the
pond, who has acquired no rights
against the public in the water of the
pond, or in the land under it, bygrant
from the legislature or by prescription: Gage v. S"einkra.s, 131 Mass.
222.
In 1841, the owners of all the lands,
lying around and bordering upon a
great pond, executed, in accordance
with an award to which they alone
were parties, an indenture containing
a recital, that they were "the lawful
proprietors in fee simple of all the
lands covered by the waters of said
pond, and of said waters and all the

privileges and appurtenances thereof,
in propcrtion to their respective
interests in the margin of said pond ;"
and by which they mnutually agreed
to divide " the surface of said pond,
and the waters thereof and the land
under the same," among themselves
in fee, according to certain lines
therein defined; and made mutual
releases accordingly, with covenants
for the quiet enjoyment by each party
of the shares and portions of the
premises to him so assigned and set
out. In 1847 one of these owners
made a conveyance of a parcel of
land, burdering upon the pond, "excepting and reserving to the grantor,
his heirs and assigns, the exclusive
right to take ice from said pond,
which has heretofore pertained to
said parcel of land, according to said
indenture;" and the grantee in 1872,
conveyed this parcel to the defendant,
reserving the same rights to the first
grantor. In 1862, the first grantor
conveyed to the plaintiff the right so
reserved. Since 1839, the proprietors
of lands adjoining the pond, had been
in the practice of cutting and storing
ice for sale. After the indenture,
lines were drawn, whenever the pond
was frozen, separating each proprietor's privilege from the others,
according to the lines defined in the
indenture, and the proprietors were
accustomed to flood the ice with water
in order to increase its thickness, and
they conformed to those lines in
preparing and cutting ice, and in
conveyances which they made of land
under the pond. No persons other
than those employed by the proprietors, ever came upon the pond to
cut ice, and fishermen who occasionally came to cut holes in the ice in
order to fish, were not allowed to do
so. The whole pond was much frequented by skaters, but it did not appear that they interfered with the ice
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cutting in any way. When tie pond
was not frozen, fishermen and others
went to all parts of it in boats. Held,
that a bill in equity to restrain the
defendant from cutting ice on the
pond, could not be maintained by the
plaintiff, either by virtue of ownership of the shore of the pond, or of
title by disseisin, or any covenant, or
contract made by or binding upon the
defendant, or any restriction imposed
upon him or his estate: fLittinger v.
Eames, 121 Mass. 539.
A similar rule exists in Maine. In
Brastow v. .Rockport Ice C,)., 77 Me.
100, the right to cut ice on "great
ponds," is held to be a public one, in
which the riparian proprietors have
no greater interest than any one else.
A bill in equity which alleges that
the plaintiff is the owner of the right
to take ice from a certain portion of a
"great pond," within the meaning of
the Colonial Ordinance of 1641, respecting such ponds, and of a fishing
right therein, and of the outlet thereof, is on demurrer, held to sufficiently
state the plaintiff's title to equitable
relief, against an unauthorized injury
to these rights, and a diversion of
water from the outlet: Tudor v. Cambridge Water Works, 1 Allen, 164.
The owners of the water of a millpond own the ice formed upon it, and
the riparian proprietors have no right,
as owners of the soil, to remove it:
till River Woolen lfanaufacturing Co.
v. Smith, 34 Conn. 462.
Where the owner of a mill and the
land on one side of the center of the
mill-pond, granted a license to an individual to take ice from that portion
of the pond, it was held, that the
grantee, on complaint that another
person was infringing upon his premises, by taking and carrying away
ice, although lie might maintain an
action of trespass, was not entitled to
an injunction to restrain the taking

of ice: Marshall v. Peters, 12 How.
Pr. 218.
A dam built across an arm of the
sea, into which a fresh-water creek
empties, to exclude the salt water, for
the purpose of creating a fresh-water
pond, upon which to cultivate and
harvest ice for the market, without
direct authority of the legislature, or
the delegated action of harbor commissioners, if the case falls within
theirjurisdiction, is in the same sense,
a public nuisance as would be a solid
wall built across a street: .Dyer v.
Curtis, 72 Maine, 181.
A deed of a tide mill privilege,
mill dam, wharf privilege and the
right to flow the creek and adjoining
lands to high-water mark, "and all
the rights and highways connected
with and belonging to said mill privilege," gives the grantee no right to
ice cutting, nor title to the ice formed
upon a fresh-water pond, raised by
changing the dam so as to exclude the
salt water: Dyer v. Curtis, 72 Maine,
181.
Where ice, valuable as an article of
commerce, was removed without license, by cutting from a pool formed
by a dam in a stream not navigable,
by a person owning the land opposite
the place where theice was cut, but the
portion of the pool from which the
ice was removed, was over the land of
another, it was held, that this was a
14, 2 G. & IL 462,
trespass under
which provides that any person who,
without a license from competent authority, shall remove from the lands
of another, any tree, stone, timber or
other valuable articles, shall be guilty
of a trespass: State v. Potmeyer, 33
Ind.402.
-ightt to take Ice from Canals.-The
legislature of the State of Indiana anthorized its publicagents to appropriate a fee simple in the lands taken for
the construction of its canals. Held,
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that the former owner had no right to
take ice from the canal: Mater Works
Cb. of Indianapolisv. Burkhart et al.,
41 Ind. 364.
The board of trustees of the Wabash & Erie Canal madean agreement
with A. and others, partners under
the name of Wabash & Erie Canal
Company, transferring for a special
time and upon special conditions
(which were performed), all the tolls
and revenues to be derived, or which
might accrue from the use of the canal.
.Hdd,that the company was as much
entitled to the ice which formea in
the canal, and to the proceeds thereof,
as it was to the tolls and water rents:
('omie v. Wabash & Erie Canal Mhustees, 71 Ind. 208.
In constructing the White Water
Valley Canal, alarge pond, producing
ice on low lands adjoining and beyond
the canal, was formed by the flow of
water from the canal, the lands covered by which pond had been used by
the State and its grantee, the canal
company, only for the purpose of overflow. The plaintiff was the grantee
of the " canal and its appurtenances."
Hld, that only the right to overflow,
and not the land overflowed itself, was
appurtenantto the canal, and the right
to gather ice upon the pond did not
belong to the plaintiff, but to the
owner of the soil, subject to the condition that no injury should be done
to the easement of the plaintiff, and
that the quantity of water should not
be materially lessened: Brookville &
.3fetarnora Hydraulic Co. v. Butler, 91
Ind. 134.
A contrary opinion was held in Card
v. McCaleb, 69 Ill. 314. Neither the
Act of 1871, nor that of April 7,
1872, relating to the Illinois & Michigan Canal gives any specific authority, or contains any grant of power,
from which any authority in the commissioners can be inferred, to sell or

lease the right to take the ice that
may form in any portion of the canal.
There is nothing in either of the Acts
of 1871 or 1872, relating to this canal,
which is inconsistent with, or which
by implication repeals the privilege,
given in the Act of 1869, to all persons
resident upon the line of the canal, to
cut and remove ice from the same, its
feeders, side cuts and basins, free of
charge. See also Edgertonv. Huff, 26
Ind. 35.
Right of Riparian Owners to take Ice
from Rirers.-In Lorman v. Benson, 8
Mich. 18, it was held, that the owner of
the bank was entitled to every beneficial use of the soil under the river,
which could be exercised with a due
regard to the public easement, and any
trespass which interfered with such
use, like an obstruction preventing the
taking of ice, gave him a right of action for the damages thereby occasioned.
The owner of land bordering on a
stream, where the tide does not ebb
and flow, owns the bed of the stream
to the center, if his land is on one side
of the stream only, or for the entire
width, if it is on both sides, and he
has the sole right to take ice formed
upon the stream opposite his land.
Neither is it a defense to an ice company, taking such ice for the purpose
of selling it, that it is an obstruction
to navigation: Vashing Ice a. v.
Shortall,101 111. 46.
When the water of a flowingstream,
running in its natural channel, is congealed, the ice attached to the soil
constitutes a part of the land and belongs to the owner of the bed of the
stream, who has the right to prevent
its removal: State v. Pottnzeyer, 33 Ind.
402; Lorman v. Ben3on, 8 'Mich. 18;
Sedey v. Brush, 33 Conn. 419.
A street bounded on one side on a
navigable stream above high-water
mark, extends to the center of the
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stream in the absence of a contrary intentin. And the adjacent lotowners
are tntitled to the ice formed on that
portion of the stream: Brooklyn v.
Satith, 101 Ill. 429.
However, in Hfickey v. ITzard, 3
Mo. App 41k), it was Iteld, that where
one had surveved and marked off ice
unappropriated by another, upon a
navigable river, ;tnd had expended
money to preserve it, and make it valuable for use, and as a commercial
commodity, such per.-on had a possession sufficient to support an action of

trespass; and in Mood v. Fowler, 26
Kan. 6S2, the court held that ariparian owner had no ownership in the
ice, formingon a navigable stream. In
the absence of legislation, one first appropriating the ice is entitled to it.
A les~ee of riparian rights may inclose and store ice for his own use and
profit, within the limits embraced in
his lease, if he does not thereby interfere with the right of navigation, or
with the proper use of the stream by
other people: Peoplds Ice Co. v. The
Excelsior, 44 Mich. 229.
D. M. MicKE,.
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If a landlord lets premises abutting upon a way, which are, from their condition or construction, dangerous to persons lawfully using the way, he is liable to such persons for injuries suflered thereupon, although the premises are
occupied by a tenant, unless the tenant has agreed with his landlord to put the
premises in proper repair.
The fact that the tenant is also liable, affords the landlord no defense.

TORT by Winnifred Dalay against Margaret Rice, executrix,
and Henry W. Savage, for personal injuries suffered by falling
into a coal-hole in the sidewalk in front of No. 10 Wall street,
Boston, to which said coal-hole was appurtenant. Prior to the
trial the plaintiff discontinued against defendant Rice, executrix.
At the trial in the superior court for Suffolk county, before
MAsON, J., it was admitted that Wall street then was, and for
many years had been, a public street; that said premises were
conveyed to defendant Savage, November 3, 1883, by virtue of
a power of sale contained in a mortgage of said premises for the
purpose of foreclosing said mortgage; and that said premises
were conveyed (subject to said mortgage) to Daniel Breslin,
April 20, 1875; and that he occupied the same from that date
till after this accident; and that he quitelaimed said premises to
defendant Savage, November 9, 1883; and that Savage was the
owner of the premises at the time of the accident. Breslin testified that he remained at a rent of $41.67 per month; that
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Savage was to give him $2,500; that Savage permitted him to
remain and pay the rent, because he (Savage) had not paid the
$2,500; that Savage, in lieu of paying him the $2,500, permitted him to remain at $41.67 per month. It appeared in
evidence that Breslin remained inl occupancy of said premises,
under said oral agreement, from said November 3d till some
months after the injuries complained of. One Duman, a witness for plaintiff, testified that, after assisting the plaintiff to her
home, he went back and examined the coal-hole, and that there
was no chain on the cover, but a three-strand rope, about threequarters of an inch thick; that the bed on which the cover laid
had filled with -snow and dirt, and that it was liable to slip the
way it was fastened. He also testified on cross-examination,
that the bed-piece or stone surrounding the coal-hole on which
the plate or cover rested was well worn, chipped off, and broken
at the edges; and that it appeared to him that this had been so
a long time, so that, whether tied or untied from the inside, the
cover, on being stepped on, would tip up; and it appeared further that the bed had not changed in this respect during the
tenancy. On the whole evidence the court ruled that the action
could not be maintained, and ordered a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
P. O'Loughlin, for plaintiff.
T. S. Dame, for defendant.
FIELD, J.-The defendant Savage received a conveyance of

the premises on November 3, 1883, having purchased them at a
sale under a power contained in a mortgage. Breslin, on April
20, 1875, had become the owner of the equity of redemption,
subject to this mortgage, and he occupied the premises from this
date until after the accident, which is said to have occurred on
December 17, 1883. On Nov. 9, 1883, Breslin quitelaimed
whatever title lie had in the premises to Savage, for which
Savage agreed to pay him. 2,500, and Breslin remained in occupation as the tenant at will of Savage, under an agreement to
pay rent at the rate of $41.67 a month. There was evidence
from which the jury might have found that the stone surrounding the cover of the coal-hole wa- permanently defective at the
time Savage became owner; that it continued in this defective
VoL. XXXVI.-32
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condition until after the accident; and was of such a character
that "the cover, on being stepped on, would tip up," whether it
was tied or not on the inside; and that the accident happened,
not through the negligent manner in which Breslin used the
premises, but through the defective condition of the stone stirrounding the cover of the hole.
Savage, as landlord, was under no obligation to Breslin to
keep the coal-hole in repair, and Breslin was under no obligation to Savage to repair it. It does not appear in the exceptious that Savage at any time knew that the coal-hole was in a
defective and dangerous condition. It seems to be settled that
if a landlord lets premises abutting upon a way, which are,
from their condition or construction, dangerous to persons lawfully using the way, lie is liable to such persons for injuries
suffered thereupon, although the premises are occupied by a
tenant, unless the tenant has agreed with his landlord to put
the premises in proper repair. That the tenant may also be
liable is not a defense to the landlord.
The case which, perhaps, most nearly resembles this, is Gandy
v. .Iubber, 5 Best & S. 78; same case on error, Id. 486. The
reasons why the court of exchequer chamber recommended that
the plaintiff consent that the proceedings be stayed do not appear
in the report; but in 9 Best & S. 15, there is what purports to
be the undelivered judgment of that court in the case. One
question was whether a landlord who has the power to determine
a tenancy from year to year by giving notice, and who does not
exercise it, is to be held as thereby reletting the premises. In
the course of the argument in the exchequer chamber, ERLE, C.
J., said of the landlord's liability: "If lie lets the premises with
a nuisance, all parties agree that lie is responsible." In the
opinion published in 9 Best & S. 15, the grounds on which the
court of exchequer chamber differed from that of the queen's
bench distinctly appear, as follows: "We agree that to bring
the liability home to the owner, the premises being let, the
nuisance must be one which was, in its very essence and nature,
a nuisance at the time of letting, and not something which was
capable of being thereafter rendered a nuisance by the tenants,
and that it is a souid principle of law that the owner of property
receiving rent should be liable for a nuisance existing upon his
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premises at the date of the demise; but that wherein we differ
is that a landlord from year to year, having the power of giving
the ordinary notice to quit, and not giving it, is thereby to be
held as reletting the premises, and that such forbearing to give
notice is equivalent to a reletting." The reason of the rule, that
if a landlord lets premises in a condition which is dangerous to
the public, or with a nuisance upon them, lie is liable to strangers for injuries suffered therefrom, is that by the letting he has
authorized the continuance of the nuisance.
Prettyv. Bickmore, L. Il. 8 C.P. 401, was decided on theground
that the tenant had covenanted to keep the premises in repair,
and therefore the landlord could not be said to have given
authority that the premises should be kept in a dangerous state.
See Leonard v. Storer, 115 Mass. 86. Gwinnell v. Earner, L.
1R. 10 0. P. 658, follows Pretty v. Biclkmore. In lNelson v.
Brewery Co., 2 C. P. Div. 311, it is expressly said that if the
landlord lets premises ina ruinous condition he is liable to
strangers. In Saltonstall v. Banker, 8 Gray, 195, 197, the decisions in Rich v. Basteifldd, 4 C. B. 783, and in Rex v. Pedly,
1 Adol. & E. 822, are approved; and it is said that if the nuisance existed at the time of the demise the landlord is liable.
See Todd v. Right, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 377. In Jackman v. Arlington Hills, 137 Mlass. 277, the landlord was held liable for
the acts of his tenants in polluting the water of a brook, by discharging into it the sink water from the houses let; and the
reason given was that the houses let were intended to be used
by the tenants in'the manner in which they were used, and that,
if the landlord did not retain the control of the water used by
the tenants, he had by the letting authorized the use which the
tenants made of the water. See, also, Owings v. Jones, 9 Aid.
108; City of Peoriav. Simpson, 110 Ill. 294, 300; Irvine v.
Wood, 51 N. Y. 224; Durant v. Palmer, 29 N. J. Law, 544.
An attempt has been made to bring the present case within
the rule that if the nuisance is created by a tenant, or by a
former owner who has let the premises to a tenant, a grantee is
not liable for any injury that may result from the condition of
the premises while the occupation of the tenant continues. If
the defendant Savage had bought the premises subject to a lease
to Breslin, who had continued in occupation under it, a differ-
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ent case would have been presented. But when the defendant
Savage purchased the l)remises, and a deed was delivered to him
by the mortgagee, pursuant to the power of sale contained in the
mortgage, he became the owner, and Breslin had no longer the
right of occupation. The defendant could then immediately
have taken possession. After this, the defendant voluntarily
let the premises to Breslin as a tenant at will, and at the time
of the accident Breslin held possession by agreement with the
defendant. It is strictly a case where the defendant let premises
with a nuisance upon them, and took no agreement from the
tenant to abate the nuisance, or to repair the premises. So far
as appears, the plaintiff was lawfully traveling upon the highway; and if the coal-hole was in a permanently dangerous condition, and this condition existed when the defendant let the
premises, the landlord is not excused from liability by the fact
that the premises were in the occupation of a tenant at the
time when the plaintiff was injured. It is not necessary to determine whether the owner or occupant is bound at all events to
keep the covering of a coal-hole in a public street safe, or is
only bound to use reasonable care. There was evidence that
the defect in the covering of the coal-hole had existed for a
long time, and was open and visible, and such that the person
whose duty it was to repair it ought to have known its condition.
In the opinion of a majority of the court the exceptions must
Exceptions sustained.
be sustained.
We propose to discuss the liability
of a landlord to third persons for an
injury sustained by them, and arising
from the condition of the leased premises.
Finsr.-ConditionofPremscs at Time
of the Demise.-"In general, that party
only is responsible for the continuance of a nuisance, who had possession ani control where it is, and upon
whom, therefore, the obligation to remove, seems properly to rest. It follows, that, as between landlord and
tenant, the party pre.umptively responsible is the tenant. But the fact.,

when developed, remove many cases
from this presumption, for the very
satisfactory reason that there are many
cases in which the party out of possession, is either in part or exclusively the party in fault. Thus, if the
owner of land, through which a watercourse runs, erects a dam across it
which sets the water back upon the
proprietor above, and then leases the
land with the nuisance upon it, he
gives with the lease implied permission for the lessee to keep up thedam,
and he thus becomes a participant
with the lessee in the wrong while the
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dam is maintained as it was when he
gave the tenant possession:" Cooley
on Torts, 609, citing ioswel v. Prior,
12 Mal. 635; s. c. 2 Salk. 460, and
1 Raym. 713. This same author
makes the following quotation from
Grady v. Wolsner, 46 Ala. 381, which
well assigns a reason for the rule just
stated: "Ile transferred it with the
original wrong, and his demise affirms
the continuance of it. lie has also
his rent as a consideration for the
continuance, and therefore ought to
answer the damage it occasions"
In Id wig v. Jordan, 53 Ind. 21; s.
c. 1 Wilson (Ind.) 447, the following
rules are determined: "1. One who
erects a. nuisance is liable for its continuance, as for a new nuisance, so
long as it continues, and it is not in
his power to release himself therefrom by granting it over to another.
2. One who delivers his property
for the purpose of having it used in
such a way as must prove offensive to
others, may himself be treated as the
-authorof the mischief.
"3. One who erects a nuisance, and
afterwards parts with the real estate
upon which it is located, either by
conveyance with a warranty or covenant that amounts to an affirmance
of the nuisance and agreement of its
continuance, or leases it on terms by
which he derives a benefit or profit
from its continuance, or leases his
real estate, receiving therefrom, and
knowing, or having reason to believe,
that the use of the property for the
purpose for which it is leased will
prove to be injurious to the property
of others, or become a nuisance, will
be liable to an action for an injury resulting therefrom!'
In the case just quoted from, the
facts were these: A. owned a lot adjoining Bfs; A. and C. went into the
lumber drying business, and erected
a drying kiln on A's lot. A. and C.

afterwards dissolved the partnership
by A. withdrawing; and C. carried on
the business. By the terms of the
dissolution, C. became the owner of
the kiln, and A., at that time, leased
the premises to him for a term of three
years, reserving rent. A. took possession under his lease, and by using
the kiln, the adjoining premises of D1.
were burned. A. was held liable.
The court said: "The mere structure
itself was not a nuisance or dangerous to any person, but its use and
operation as akiln, at the place where
it was situated, was necessarily dangerous to the property of the appellec. There was no agreement,
covenant or guaranty on the part of
the appellant, that his lessees should
have the right to continue time use of
the said kiln; nor does it expressly
appear that he was to receive any
rent or profit from the continued use
of said kiln; but it does appear that
he knew his lessee intended to continue the said business, and that such
kiln was ne2s',arv to the successful
operation thereof. lie received rent
for the entire premises, which included the kiln, and lie is to be presumed to have known or to have reason to believe that his lessees would,
under his lease, continue to use the
same in the same manner in which it
had been used and for the purpose for
which it wasconstructed; and it is to
be further presumed that lie knew the
danger which would result to the
property of the appellee by such use."
So, where a defendant leased to a
tenant a lot, in which stood a number
of old chimneys, in a ruinous condition, at tie time of the lease, and the
defendant knew it and so maintained
them, and they fell on the plaintiff's
house, it was held that the former was
liable. "It is alleged that the defendant let the house when the chimneys
were known to him to be ruinous and
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in danger of falling, and that lie kept
and maintained them in this state,
and thus lie was guilty of the wrongfill noin-repairs which led to the damage, and after the demise the fall appearsto have risen from no fault of
the les:ee, but by (the) laws of nature :" Todd v. Flight, 9 C. B. (N.S.)
377; s. v. 9 J. scott (N. S.) 377.
This doctrine has been carried
much farther. Thuswhere the owner
of land Itoodeid his neighbor's premises by erecting a dani, and then conveyed his lanl with covenants of
seizin and of quiet enjoyment, " with
the right to flow Ls far as has hitherto
been necessary, for the use of the mills
on the premises conveyed, the dam
remaiing at its present height," it
was held, that the grantor was liable
for the continuance of the nuisance,
as having expressly aflirnied and conveyed it: Wgygoner v. Jcrndae, 3
I)enio, 306. See Staple v. Spring, 10
Mass. 72; Cahillv. Estman, 1 3inn.
324 ; .East,nanv. Antos 'rf, 44 N. I.
143. If the possession had p:,ssed to
others, without any evideace of any
conveyance or demise, t he rule would
have been otherwise; for in such an
instance, there would be no evidence
that the will of the party granting
the dam, accompanied and encouraged the continuance of the nuisance,
and the law must refer it to the will
of the possessor: Blunt'v. Aikin, 15
Wend. 522; Roswdl v. Prior, 1 Ld.
Raym. 713; .Beswick v. Canden, Cro.
Eliz. 402, 520; Cheethan v. Ilampson,
4 T. It. 318.
There are many cases which support the rule, holding the landlord
liable, where he erects defective premises: I'eddcr v. Thvsder, 1 )en. 257 ;
Shid,'lbeck V. jMoon, 17 Amer. L.
Reg. 450; s. c.32 Ohio St. 26.1; Ouings v. Jones, 9 MNd.108; House v.
MetcaVlJ 27 Conn. 632; Gandy v. Jubber, 9 B. & S. 15, reversing 5 3. & S.

485; Pish v. Dodge, 4 1)enio, 311;
Hdley v. Tiylor, L. 1. 1 C. P. 53;
Fi.ke v. Franinlnam .YCen. Co., 14
Pick. 491 ; -Yortan v. 1l'7strall,26 Barb.
618; .Rich v. llasterfild, 4 Ma. G.
& Scott, 783; .Robbimi v. Mount, 33
Ihow. Pr. 21; s. c. 4 Rob. 561; Be!loi's v. Sackett, 15 Barb. 96; Pickardv.
GCllins, 23 Barb. 4-15 ; Moody v..Mayor,
etc., 43 Barb. 282; Bensm v. Suarez.
43 Barb. 409; s. c. 21 How. Pr. 511 :
19 Abb. Pr. 61; Cityl of Chicago v.
O'Brennan, 65 Il. 160; Cla try v.
Byne, 56 N.Y. 129; .iPDonoughv.Gilman, 3 Allen, 267; Davenportv. Buckman, 16 Abb. Pr. 3t ; s. c. 10 Bosw.
20; 37 N.Y. 568; .tadcraonv.Dickie,
26 How. Pr. 105; s. c. 1 Rob. 238;
Irrine v. frlood, 51 N. Y. 224; s.c. 4
Rob. 138 ; Leonard Y. Storer, 115
'Mass. 86 ; Sword.%v. Edgar, 59 N. Y.
28.
But in all such cases, the landlord
must have had notice of the defect,
at the time lie rented the premises,
or before the injury, with time power
of entering and repairing the defect.
or at least have had such knowledge
as would put a prudent man on inquiry: Gwinnell v. Bamer, L. I. 10 C.
P. 658; .dward,. v. New I-orl, etc., B.)?.
an., 98 N. Y. 245.
So, if a landlord rents his premise.,
in such a condition that the use of
them by the tenant, in the way intended by the landlord, creates a nuisance, the latter is liable. This is
well illustrated by the Indiana case,
already cited; and a Connecticut case.
where the owner of a mill, situated
so near a highway that its revolving
wheel frightened the horses, held that
the landlord was liable. In this case,
it was taken for granted that the
owner intended the lessee to use it in
the manner lie had ; aind thius, he aothorized the creation of a nuisance:
louse v. Xetraf, 27 Conn. 632. So.
the same was held of a linmekiln, iha-
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properly constructed and then leased:
Slight v. Gutzlaff, 35 Wis. 675; and of
a privy and pipe in the leased house
used by the tenant, although the latv.
ter was also liable: M'Calluma
.Hutchison, 7 U. C. (C. P.) 508; so,
of an improperly constructed drain,
necessary to the use and enjoyment of
the demised premises: &ott v. Sinons,
54N. H. 426; and the like: Alton v.
Grant 3 El. D 12S; Giodleyv. Hagerty, 20 Pa. St. 3S7; .ccres v. Larl.in,
19 1o. 192; Church, etc., v. Buckhart,
3 Hill, 193; Bellows v.Sackett, 15 Barb.
96; Pickardv. Collins, 23 Barb. 444.
So, when a landlord rented a house
and took no precautions against the
snowslippingdown upon thesidewalk,
nor made any arrangements with the
tenants about clearing the roof, lie
was held liable: Shipley v..Fifty Associates, 101 M1ass. 251 ; s. c. 106 Mass.
194; although, as we shall see, he
might have'relieved himself of such
a liability by an agreement with his
tenants.
Yet, there is a case which seems
somewhat at variance with those just
stated. There, the owner of a house,
standing back from the street, built a
low shop between his house and the
street, with a chimney, and rented out
the shop. The tenant used the chimney for a fire, and when the wind was
from a certain direction, smoke was
blown into the plaintiff's window,
causing him great annoyance. The
defendant, the owner, was sued on the
ground that he built the chimney
which made the nuisance, and was
answerable for the ordinary use of it.
The court held that the chimney was
not itself a nuisance but it was the
fire that was made by the tenant; that coke might have been
used, or he might have abstained
from having a fire when the wind was
in the wrong direction, and the owner
therefore was not liable. He had no

control over the fire: Rich v. Basterfield, 4 C. B. 783.
Reletting.-If the premises are in
good repair when leased, and while
the lease is in force, become out of
repair, and are then relet in that condition, the landlord is liable to the
same extent as if they had never been
leased: Inguersen v. Rankin, 47 N. J.
L. 18.
Contract of Tenant to .Repair.-The
landlord may, however, escape liability to third persons by reason of the
defective premises, by entering into
a contract with his tenant to repair
them. This was decided in the early
case of Payne v. Rogers, 2 11. Blk.350.
Usually the defect must be such that
the injury might have been avoided
by care on the part of the tenant:
Leonard v. Storer, 115 Mass. 86; Pretty
v. Rickmnore, L. R. 8 C. P. 401 ; Gwinnell v. Earner,L. R. 10 C. P. 658 ; s.
c. 14 Moak. 492; Gandy v. Jubber,
5 B. & S. 78; s. c. 33 L. J. (Q. B.)
151 ; Whalen, v. Gloucester, 4 Hun. 24;
Nelson v. Lierpool Brewery Co., L. R.
2 C. P. Div. 311 ; s. c. 21 'Moak. 308 ;
Russell v. Shenton, 3 L. B. 449; City
of Chicago v. O'Brennan, 65 111. 160.
This is very well illustrated by the
caseof Gn'innell v.Eanzer supra.There,
the plaintiff was injured by the giving away of a grating in a public
footway, which was used for a coal
shoot and for letting light into the
lower part of the premises adjoining.
These premises were at the time of
the accident, under lease, and the
lessee had covenanted to repair and
keep in repair all except the roofs,
main walls and main timbers. At
the time of the demise, the grating
was unsafe; but there was no evidence that the defendant, the landlady, had any knowledge of its unsafe
state; and the jury found that no
blame was attributable to her for
not knowing it. It i as held that
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the defendant was not liable, because
of her contract with the tenant.
Landlordnot LiableforAfter (badition
of Prevnizs.-' If the premises are in
good repair when demised, but afterwards become ruinous and dangerous,
the landlord is not responsible therefor either to the occupant or to the
public:" (Cancy v. Byrne, 56 -. Y.
129; Todd v. Flight, 9 C. B. (N. S.)
377; ":nd this rule applies to a les,Ce who has in turn sublet, and is
out of possession, as well as to an
owner and prime lessor:" Clancy v.
Bilrne, supra.
"If a landlord let premises, not
in themselves a nuisance, and it is
entirely at the option of the tenant
to so use them or not as that they
.hall become so, and the landlord will
receive the same benefit if they be
not so used, the landlord is not res1,oni-ible, if by the careless use by
the tenant they become a nuisance:"
Clancy v. Byrne, supra;Rich v. Basterfield, 4 Man. Gr. & Scott, 783. "IIis
bare ownership will not produce that
result:" Wolf v. Kilpatrik, 101 N.
Y. 146, 151.
Consequently, where a tenant built
a paper vault under, and put a coalhole in, a sidewalk; and, by the improper conduct of a stranger, who
broke the stone supporting the iron
cover of the coal-hole, the cover
turned when the plaintiff" stepped
upon it, and lie fell and was injured,
it was held that the owners of the
premises were not liable, nor would
they have been so if they had constructed the vault and coal-hole, and
then let the premises: 1Iolf v. KuIpatrick, 101 N. Y. 146. So, the landlord is not liable to a person passing
along a walk leading from the street
to the rented buildings, for the purpose of transacting business with the
tenant, whereby lie i. injured by falling down an embankment adjoining

the walk, although the estate was in
that condition when let. "lie, the
defendant, had leased it to a tenant,
and there was nothing to show that
lie retained any control over the
walk, or any right to direct the purposes for which tile premises should
be used. The fact that the walk was
in the same condition before the demise, is not material. The defendant
did not guarantee that the premises
should be safe for all the uses to which
the tenant might put them. The
tenant alone had the right to determine the purposes for which Ile should
use the premises. If lie used them
so, as impliedly, to invite people
to visit them in the night, it was his
duty to make them safe by a railing,
or by a light, or by warning. It was
not the duty of the landlord, and indeed lie would not have the right,
without the consent of the tenant, to
do so :" M.Aellen v. Morrill, 126 Mass.
545.
So, where certain premises
were let, and the lessee turned them
into a house of public entertainment,
and changed the use of the gallery,
the landlord was held not liable for
its breaking down and injuring those
below: Edmrards v. New York, etc., B.
B. Co., 9 3N. Y. 245. See Bobbins v.
Jones, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 220.
The owners of a building provided
with machinery run by steam power,
rented one floor to L. for the purpose
of a laundry. .The defendant furnished power, which was supplied by
means of a revolving slaft. L.put a
partition through the room near the
shaft. Tie plaintiff, who was in the
employ of L., in attempting to pass
between the pirtitioi and the shaft,
was caught by the latter and injured.
It was held, that the defendant was
not liable; that the premises having
been delivered to thme tenant inasuitable condition to serve the purpo-e
for which they were rented, if altera-

DALAY v. RICE ET AL.
tions %ere required, it was his duty,
not that of the defendant. to make
them : Ryan, v. Wilson, 87 M. Y. 471;
s. c. 13 J. & S. 273. See, however,
Bobbins v. Jones, 109 E. C. L. 220.
But where the tenant continued the
use of a defective coal-hole, both lie
and his landlord were held liable: irvine v. Wood, 51 . Y. 224; s. c. 4
Robt. 138.
Landlord's Contract to Repair.There is no doubt that alandlord may
become liable for the subsequent condition of the demised premises, if he
has entered into a contract with the
tenant, to repair. " We think there
are only two ways in which landlords
or owners can be made liable, in the
case of an injury to a stranger by the
defective repairs of premises let to a
tenant, the occupier and the occupiers
alone being prima facieliable; first, in
the case of a contract by the landlord
to do repairs, where the tenant can
sue him for not repairing; secondly,
in the case of a misfeasance by the
landlord, as, for instance, where he
lets premises in a ruinous condition.
In either of these cases, we think an
action would lie against the owner:"
Nelson v. Liverpool Brewery Co., L. R.
2 0. P. Div. 311; s. c. 21 MNoak. 308;
Payne v. Rogers, 2 H. Bl. 349; Todd
v..Flight, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 377; s. c. 30
C. J. (C. P.) 21 ; Russell v. Shenton, 3
Q. B. 449; Pretty v. Bickmore, L. R.
8 C. P. 401; Gridley v. City of Bloom-

ington, 68 Il1. 47; Se'ern v. Eddy, 52
Ill. 189; (see, Burdid v. Cheadle, 26
Ohio St. 393); Shirdelbeck v. Moon, 32
Ohio St. 264; s. c. 17 Amer. L. Reg.
450; Edwards v. New York, etc., R. P.
Co., 98 N. Y. 245; Leonmrd v. Storer,
115 Mass. 86; City of Lowell v. Spaulding, 4 Cush. 277; Beais v. Anibler, 9
Pa. St. 193; Owings v. Jones, 9 31d.
lOS; Fisher v. Tirkell, 21 Mich. 1 (a
coal-bole or scuttle becoming out of
repairs after lease); Clancy v. Byrne,
56 N. Y. 129; s. c. 65 Barb. 344; Campbell v. PortlandSugar Co., 62 le. 552.
-Pleadingand Proif.-In order to
charge the landlord, lie being out of
possession, it must be averred and
proven, that the defect existed at the
time of the leasing; or that he was
under a covenant to repair, and had
notice of the defect, or by reasonable
diligence could have ascertained it.
If one of these averments are not embodied in the petition, it is defective:
Shindelbeck v. 31oon, supra; Gandy v.
Jabber,9 B. & S. 15; reversing 5 B.
& S. 485; for the law presumes the
tenant was bound to repair and that
the landlord was not liable: Batterman v. .Finn,321-How. Pr. 501; K[a.tor
v. Newhouse, 4 E. D. Smith, 20; Rich
v. Basterfield, 4 C. B. 783 ; Bobbins v.
Mount, 33 How. Pr. 36; s. c. 4 Rob.
561 ; Clancy v. Byrne, 56 N. Y. 129;
see Regina v. Barrett, 9 C. C. 255.
W. W. THORNTON.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Supreme Court of -Pennsylvania.
GOETTEL v. SAGE ET AL.
Where a, vendor, believing that lie has a good tax title to land, so states,
but declines to covenant or to convey, except by a quit-claim deed, and upon
his advice, the vendee consults an attorney, by whom the title is pronounced valid, whereupon the vendee gives a bond for the purchase-money,
he may, nevertheless, in an action on the bond, showv that the tax sale
upon which the vendor's title rested, was utterly void and consequently
that the bond was without consideration.
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ERROR to Common Pleas of Venango county. Debt on a
bond by Sage and Sheasley, against Goettel. Plea, nil debet.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
At the trial, the judge charged that the defense set up was
not good, and directed a verdict for the plaintiff, if the jury believed the evidence. Verdict for plaintiff. The defendant took
this writ.

C. Heydrick (H. D. Hancock with him), for plaintiff in
error.
George L. Criswell (J. I. Osmer with him), for defendant in
error.
WILLIAMS, J.-This was an action upon a bond. The defense set up, was failure of consideration. The question raised
by the assignments of error, is whether the facts which the defendant proposed to prove in support of this defense should be
allowed to go to the jury. It is necessary to examine the facts
out of which this litigation arises, in order to a proper determination of this question.
The evidence shows that lots Nos. 47, 67, and 68, containing
two hundred acres each, adjoined each other successively, and
that Alfred Pearce was the owner of two hundred acres, located
in such manner as to occupy part of each of the said lots, as
shown in the diagram below. [Diagram omitted.]
Prior to 1872, Pearce's land was assessed in the manner following:-

Owners.
Alfred Pearce

Numbers.
47-68.

Acres.
200.

In the years 1872 and 1873 the number 47 was dropped by
assessor and the assessment was left to stand thus
Owners.
Alfred Pearce

Numbers.
68.

Acres.
200.

The taxes thus assessed for 1872 and 1873 were not paid, and
the land was sold at treasurer's sale. Sage, one of the plaintiffs
below, and J. E. Muse, who not long after transferred his title
to Sheasley, were the purchasers and received a treasurer's deed,
which followed the description in the assessment. The west
half of No. 68 was owned by other parties, to whom it was
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regularly assessed and by whom the taxes were paid. The east
half only was owned by Pearce, and it was upon that the taxes
were unpaid.
In November, 1883, Goettel, desiring to purchase the west
half of No. 68, and being informed that Sage and Sheasley
claimed title to it, applied to Sage to know if they were the
owners. He was informed by him that they were, and that they
had a tax title to it which he believed to be a good title. Negotiations were then opened by Goettel for its purchase. lie
was informed by Sage that while they believed their title to be a
good one, they would not warrant it to be so, but would convey
only by a quit-claim deed, and that he had better get an attorney
to examine the title, as they would sell in no other way. Goettel accordingly employed an attorney to examine the records and
ascertain the nature and validity of the title of Sage and Sheasley to the west half of No. 68. The attorney reported to him
that he considered their title to be a good one, and Goettel then
purchased the west half of No. 68 for two thousand dollars,
paying seven hundred dollars in cash and giving the bond now
in suit for the remaining thirteen hundred dollars. After the
transaction was closed, Goettel learned that the west half of No.
68 was owned by other parties, to whom it was assessed and
whose taxes had been paid; that Pearce never owned it; that it
was at no time liable to sale for unpaid taxes; and that lie had
absolutely nothing for his money and his bond. He then tendered a reconveyance to Sage and Sheasley, and gave notice of
his rescission of the contract. They declined the tendered reconveyance, and on the maturity of the bond, brought this
action.
The contention of the plaintiffs below is that the defendant
cannot now be heard upon the defense he sets up, because they
gave and he accepted a quit-claim deed. As there was no covenant of warranty, and no intentional fraud, they insist that the
defendant shall pay the consideration although he gets nothing
whatever for it. This is against equity, and no rule of law
requires it. Let it be conceded that Sage and Sheasley believed
they had a good tax title to the west half of No. 68, and
were honest in expressing their opinion about its validity to
Goettel. Let it also be conceded that the attorney who exam-
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ined the records anod advised that the title was good, behaved
with fidelity to his client, and that Goettel purchased the title
because he believed it to be good. Ncvcrthcle.s the fact is,for
the fact must be taken to bt as expressed in the offer, that the
vendors. the attorney, and the vendee were all mistaken. The
land had not been in arrcars for taxes and could not have been
sold by the treasurer. The vendors had no tax title to it and
Goettel got none from them. A similar question was raised in
the omatissionersv. Smilh (10 W\atts, 391). There an action
was brought to recover the amount bid at a tax sale, as unseated.
The delcnse was that the lot was seated, and under cultivation, when the taxes for which it was sold, were assessed.
This was held to l)e a good defense, both in the court below and
illthis court. In the opinion, it was said, that "the land,
being seated, was not within the power given to the county
comissioners and their treasurer. The whole proceeding, being coram von judice, was void, and it would be iniquitous to
prevent the purchaser friom showing it." The case in hand is a
-tronger one than the Commissioe,'s v. Smith, for the taxes on
the west half of -o. 68 had been paid, and nothing but a blunder on the part of the assessor, furnished a pretext for the claim
that Sage and Sheasley had a tax title to it. Why, then, shall
not the purchaser be permitted to show that all parties to the
contract dealt under the influence of a mistake, or contracted
about a thing that had no existence, viz., a tax title to the west
half of No. 68? There is no reason in morals or in law. This
court recognized the right to rescind a contract made under the
influence of mutual mistake, in the recent cases of Babcock v.
Day, 104 Penna. State Rep. 4, and in Wilson's Appeal, 109
Penna. State Rep. 606, and in Johnson's Appeal, 114 Penna.
State Rep. 132. It is apparent, that the defense set up by the
defendant, is one that he has a perfect right to make, and as the
facts grouped in the offer were competent and pertinent evidence
in support of it, the court erred in rejecting it.
Judgment reversed and venirefaciasde novo awarded.
"We have gonefurther in Pennsylvani:, in relieving purchasers of real
estate from payment of purchasenmnev on the ground of defects and

encumbrances," said WOODWARD, J.,
in Beauplaud v. .ilrKeen, 28 Pa. St.
130, "than courts of justice have gone
in any other State or country, where
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the common law obtains. All administer not only equitable relief, while
the contract remains executory, but
after it has been executed by deed
made and delivered, we give the purchaser, besides the full benefit of any
covenants his deed may contain, the
right to defend himself from payment
of the purchase-money, however solemn tle instrument by which it is secured, if lie can show a clear outstanding defect or encumbrance, unless lie
expressly assumed the risk of it. In
England, and in most of the States
around us, the equitable right of the
purchaser to detain unpaid purchasemoney, depends on the covenants in
his deed. He is not compelled to pay
what he could recover back in damages, by an action at law; but, as his
equity springs from breach of a legal
covenant, lie has no title to relief
where there is no covenant, or a covenant but no breach."
The question involved in the principal case presents an interesting and
instructive field of inquiry; the general principles are very clearly set
forth in the foregoing extract from
Judge "WooDWARD'S opinion. But,
like all general principles, their application is not always easy, nor are
they viewed alike by all tribunals in
rimilar cases. Judge WOODWARD'S
statement, that in order to render a
purchaser liable where there is an
after-discovered defect or encumbrance, lie must have erpressly assumed the risk, is probably somewhat
too strong.
The cases in Pennsylvania, in which
State the principal case arose, may be
said to begin with Steinhaucr v. Witman, 1 S.& ru. 438. A. had sold land
to B. by deed containinga covenant of
special warranty, payment being
partly in cash, and partly by B.'s bond
and mortgage. A., in suit on the
mortgage, was met by L's ofibr to

prove, tlat, as to part of the premises,
there had been an eviction by title
paramount. This evidence the court
admitted. A. carried the case to the
Supreme Court and argued there, that
B. bad only a covenant of special warrantyto rely on, and that it would be
a practical converbion of this into a.
covenant of general warranty, were he
allowed to make the defense proposed.
Chief Justice TILGHMAN said that
were the question entirely new, it
would be difficult to answerthis argument satisfactorily, but that a diflZrent principle had been established.
entitling a defendant to equitab!e relief (obtainable in Pennsylvania by
defense to an action at law) where the
money hadvot been paid, but mcrely secured. iHe seems to have relied mainly
on an anonymous English case in 2
Ca. in Ch. 19. His colleague, Judge
YEATES, goes into the question more
fully. He meets the very strong contention of plaintiffjust mentioned, by
saying that the intention of the parties contracting was to give a quid pro
quo, and that it would be repugnant to
natural justice to compel payment
under such circumstances. With regard to the apparently admitted distinction between detention and recovery
back of, purchase-money, lie remarks
that it is a hardship that money so
paid cannot be recovered back, but
that such is the law. "To adopt a
cant expression, the funeral has
passed by, the dead cannot be resuscitated. But in my sense of the Pennsylvania system of law, there is a locus
pomitentiw until the money is paid.
Something remains bnfieri, and the
plain dictates of common sense and
common honestypoint out the correct path to be pursued"
In commenting upon the case in
Ligdy v. Shorb, 3 Penrose & Watts,
447, in one of his usual luminous opinions, Chief Jtustice GisoN., adverts to
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the law, as he conceives it te beunquestionably elsewhere, that ai'ter the
contract has been executed by the delivery of a deed, only fraud or breach
of covenant will authorize detention
or recovery back of purchase-money.
lie condemns as unsound the distinction between detention and recovery
back, and does not understand Judge
YlxTEs's approval of the rule, perinitting detention but denying recovery back. Chief Justice TiLGIHMAX,

in affirming Steinhauer v. llitman in
.art v. Porter, 5 S. & R. 201 (even
where there had been no eviction),
said that he had reluctantly assented
to the doctrine of that ease because it
seemed to be the settled usage in the
State.
It is equally certain that where
only a "claim" is sold, the buyer
cannot defend on the ground of defect
in title: Hlerrod v. Blaekburn, 56 Pa.
St. 103; MfeClure v. McClure, 11 Id.
477. It is useless to multiply authorities. The law in Pennsylvania, has been unaltered since (except
that the distinction between detention and recovery back seems to have
disappeared) and is founded on the
cases cited. The reader may be referred in addition to Johnson's Appeal,
114 Penna. State Rep. 132; Bellas v.
.Halys, 5 S. & R. 427; Babcock v. Day,
104 Pa. St. 4; Wilson's Appeal, 109
Id. 606; Angier v. Eaton Co., 98 Id.
594; 1leck v. Shener, 4 S. & R. 252;
Youngian v. Linn, 52 Pa. St. 413.
The question as to whether or not
the buyer has assumed the risk, is for
the jury: 3Murphy v. Richardson, 28
Pa. St. 292.
The principal case, in view of the
authorities, is certainly close. There
was but a quit-claim deed given, and
that after the buyer had been especially put upon inqui:y as to the
soundness of the title. lit there can
be little doubt of its correctness,

upon the ground of mutual mistake.
Had the seller given a tax title, there
can be no question that the buyer
would have had to pay the balance of
the money, even had the title been
worthless. But it will be remembered that the purchaser is only to be
held to have assumed risk, when it
plainly appears that such was his intention, and the purchaser in the
principal case can hardly be said to
have assumed the risk of there being
no title at all, but only as to the soundness of the tax title.
The rule appears to be substantially the same in New York, Granger
v. Olcott, 1 Lansing, 169, in which, as
in the principal case, there had been
only a quit-claim deed given, decided
that when the title was believed by
both grantor and grantee to be doubtful, there could be no recovery back
of the consideration on account of the
worthlessness of the title ; but if there
had been a mutual mistake in thinking
the title good, there could be such
recovery. See also Brownel v. Russell,
20 New York Weekly Dig 504;
George v. Tallman, 5 Lansing, 392.
It is a well-known general rule,
that money paid under a mistake of
fact can be recovered back. See Mr.
F. A. Lewis's note to 3farriotv. 11am.
ton, 2 Sm. Ldg. Cases (Sth Am. ed.)
451 el seq. And this, although the
mistake was owing to the negligence
of the party seeking the recovery, unless the position of the other party
has changed so as to make it inequitable: Mayer v..Mayor of N. Y., 63 N.
Y. 455. And it is always necessary
in rescinding a contract to restore the
status qua ante.
What is meant by this, however, is
simply that the party rescinding must
with due promptitude, restore unreservedly what he has received, unless
it is worthless, not that he must indemnify the other party for any ex-
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penditures made upon the expectation of receivin~g money under the
contract. In Bank v. Ettinge. 40 "N.
Y. 391, where the recover.y back of
money was resisted upon the ground
that the status quo ante could not be
restored, HUNT, C. J., said, "The
application of this principle to the
present case would substantially destroy the rule, that money paid under
a mistake of fact may be recovered
back. If the facts could be so arranged that there should be no loss
to either party, there would be nothing to contend about, and no such
*
actions would be brought. *
It is an ordinary result of the transaction, that the party receiving, has
incurred liabilities or paid money,
which he would not have done, except
for the receipt of the money." So, in
Graves v. Brinkerhoff, 4 Hiun. 305,
when A. had sold B. a lot of ground
by metes and bounds at so much per
acre, as containing forty-one acres,
and subsequently sold the balance of
the tract at a lump sum, supposing it
to contain sixty-five acres, the whole
tract having originally contained one
hundred and six acres, it was held
that it appearing six years afterwards,
that the first lot only contained
thirty-seven acres, the over-paid
money could be recovered back, even
though the last sold tract really contained sixty-nine acres, and was sold
for less than it would have been but
for the mistake; and this, too, without rescinding the contract by tendering a reconveyance and demanding a
retu.rn of the whole purchase-money,
for the contract could still be carried
out as originally intended. And see
as to rescission, Weeks v. .Pobie,42 N.
II. 316; Pearsoll v. Chapin, 44 Pa.
St. 1; Babcock v. Case, 61 Id. 427.
In New Hampshire, Perkins v.
Bumford, 3 N. I. 522, is diretly in
point and is in conflict with the prin-

cipal case. The whole subject is instructively discussed byEASTAxN, J.,
in Getehielv. CIase, 37 X. II. 100. His
concluions from a review of the authorities are: 1. That whe'e land is
conveyed by deed, with a covenant of
warranty, it is doubtful whether the
purchase-money can be detained, the
2. The
authorities being divided.
weight of authoriky is against the
right to recover it back, if paid. 3.
Where there has been a mere quitclaim deed, there can be neither detention nor recovery back.
It is, to say the least, doubtful
whether these couclu,,ioniare correct
at the present time. The tendency
seems to be now, to carry out as
far as possible, the original intentions
of the parties. In Rand v. P-ebber,
64 31e. 191, a deed did not include,
by fraud or mistake, a promised lot of
ten acres, described in the prior oral
agreement as "worth $200!" The
price agreed on and paid for all the
land was $500. Plaintiffsougt to recover back part of the money paid,
without rescinding. The court held
this impossible. The contract was for
a gross sum, and the amount necessarily recoverable would be the proportion paid for the omitted lot, not
its actual value. Goodspeed v. Fuller,
46 Me. 141, apparently in conflict with
Band v. W1rebber, is not so really, for
there the bargain was for two distinct
v. Gunlots. As was said in .TVll
ningham, 1 Munford (Va.) 330, and
Lawrence v. Staigg, 8 Rhd. IsId. 256,
the object of the courts is to put the
parties in the positions they would
have held had therebeen no mistake.
This idea is observable in all the anthorities, where the actual bargain
can still be carried out, as by paying
the additional so much per acre, or
refunding an excess of nayment in
such a case, this mu-t be done:
Grates v. BDrakerhoff,and Lawrence v.
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Slaigg, supra. And it was held in man V. Trinity Church, 123 Mass. 1;
.lassie v. lleiskell, 80 Va. 789, that Iewshau; v. Lefferman, 51 Mld. 283;
Cochran v. Pascault, 54 Id. 1 ; Ca.nnwhere a vendee had got more land
than he bargained for, the vendor had berlaine v. 3M'arsh, 6 Munford (Va.)
a lien on the excess for the additional 283; Gilhore v. 1Temblin, 37 Ark.
626; Hill v. Bush, 19 Id. 522; Grifamount due.
See generally, Brown v. Linphear, fith v. Townley, 69 Mo. 13; M1cDonald
35 Vt. 252; 31cad v. Johnson, 3 v. Lynch, 59 Id. 350.
Lucius S. LAN-DnTH.
Conn. 597; Church v. A&cel, 42 Id. 65;
Gates v. ltinslo,', 1 Mass. 65; W'lliams v. lathaway, 19 Pick. 3S7 ; PickPhiladelphia.

Snpjrene Court of Pennsyl'ania.
TIE ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. BEATTY.
Where there is no duty of speech, there can be no harmful omission, from
mere silence.
Where a policy of insurance against fire had expired, and the insured asked
at the office of the insurance company to have his policy renewed, but received no answer, and went away, supposing his policy was renewed: Held,
that silence to a question, is different from silence to a declaration of a fact,
and is evidence either, that the question was not heard, or, that the request
would not be complied with.
When a question is asked embodying a request to make a contract, it is the
questioners duty to securean answer, as silence is not assent in any sense, and
cannot affbrd a footing for an inference that the parties have contracted.
WRIT of error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Philadelphia county.
This was an action to recover for a loss by fire, occurring on
the 10th of January, 1887. The Royal Insurance Company
had insured the burned premises, by a policy which expired on
the 6th of January, 1887. On the 5th of January, a clerk of
the broker having the policies in charge, was directed to have
this renewed, with others expiring on the 6th of January. He
did call for this purpose, intending to have this policy inade
binding: which means, renewed, or agreed to be deemed in force,
till it was ascertained that there would be a change in the rate,
and then the insured would determine whether to let the policy
drop or renew. The clerk had a memorandum of other policies
for other people with hiim, in which he wished to have altered
the privilege of working by night. He testified that he spoke
to the clerk of the insuraace company whose business it was to
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make the extensions and renewals, and asked to have this policy
bound. He also asked to have the night clause extended to the
other policies. Upon the request to renew or bind the policy in
question, he admitted that the clerk said nothing and did nothing, but he assumed or believed he had assented, and so reported
to his employer. As to the night clauses, a sharp discussion
took place. The defendants gave evidence that the clerk who
-was asked to renew the policy, had heard nothing of the request
to insure. And they offered testimony to corroborate this, and
that the clerk and the insurance company had acted upon the belief that the policies were not renewed and were not in force,
before the time of the fire. This evidence was rejected, and the
case was treated as a mere question of memory, and which of
the clerks was accurate.
Morton P. Henry and Bichard C. Mo3iartrie, for plaintiff in
error.
Geo. H. Earle, Jr., and Bichard P. White, for defendant in
error.
GREEN, J.-We find ourselves unable to discover any evidence of a contractual relation between the parties to this
litigation. The contract alleged to exist was not founded upon
any writing, nor upon any words, nor upon* any act done by
It was founded alone upon silence. While
the defendant.
it must be conceded that circumstances may exist which will
impose a contractual obligation by mere silence, yet it must
be admitted that such circumstances are exceptional in their
We have not
character, and of extremely rare occurrence.
been furnished with a perfect instance of the kind by the counsel
on either side of the present case. Those cited for defendant in
error had some other element in them than mere silence, which
contributed to the establishment of the relation. But in any
point of view it is difficult to understand how a legal liability
can arise out of mere silence of the party, sought to be affected,
unless he was subjected to a duty of speech which was neglected,
to the harm of the other party. If there was no duty of speech
there could be no harmful omission arising from mere silence.
Take the present case as an illustration. The alleged contract
was a contract of fire insurance. The plaintiff held two policies
VOL. XXXVI.-34
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against the defendant, but they had expired before the loss
occurred and had not been formally renewed. At the time of
the fire the plaintiff held no policy against the defendant. But
he claims that the defendant agreed to continue the operation of
the expired policies by what he calls "binding" them. How
does he prove this? He calls a clerk who took the two policies
in question along with other policies of another person to the
agent of the defendant to have them renewed and this is the
account he gives of what took place. "The Royal Company
had some policies to be renewed and I went in and bound them.
Q. State what was said and done. A. I went into the office of
the Royal Company and asked them to bind the two policies of
Mr. Beatty expiring to-morrow. The Court-Who were the
policies for? A. For Mr. Beatty. I ie Court-That is your
name, is it not? A. Yes, sir. These were the policies in
question. I renewed the policies of 'Mr. Priestly up to the Ist
of April. There was nothing more said about the Beatty policies at that time. The Court-What did they say? A. They
did not say anything, but I supposed that they went to their
books to do it. They commenced to talk about the night privilege and that was the only subject discussed." In his further
examination he was asked: "Q. Did you say anything about
those policies (Robert Beatty's) at that time? A. No, sir, I
only spoke of the two policies for William Beatty. Q. What
did you say about them ? A. I went in and said, ' Mr. Skinner, will you renew the Beatty policies, and the night privilege
for r. Priestly ?' and that ended it. Q. Were the other companics bound in the same way? A. Yes, sir, and I asked the
Royal Company to bind Mr. Beatty." The foregoing is the
whole of the testimony for the plaintiff as to what was actually
said at the time when it is alleged the policies were bound. It
will be perceived that all that the witness says, is, that lie
asked the defendant's agent to bind the two policies, as lie states
at first, or to renew them as lie says last. He received no answer, nothing was said, nor was anything done. How is it
possible to make a contract out of this? It is not as if one declares or states a fact in the presence of another and the other
is silent. If the declaration imposed a duty of speech on peril
of an inference from silence, the fact of silence might justify the
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inference of an admission of the truth of the declared fact.

It

would then be only a question of hearing wlhich would be
chiefly, if not entirely, for the jury. But here the utterance was
a question and not an assertion, and there was no answer to the
question. Instead of silence being evidence of an agreement to
do the thing requested, it is evidence either that the question
was not beard, or that it was not intended to comply with the
request. Especially is this the case when, if a compliance was
intended, the request would have been followed by an actual
doing of the thing requested. But this was not done. How then
-can it be said it was agreed to be done? There is literally
nothing upon which to base the inference of an agreement, upon
such a state of facts. Hence the matter is for the court and
not for the jury, for if there may not be an inference of the controverted fact the jury must not be permitted to make it.
What has thus far been said, relates only to the effect of the
non-action of the defendant, either in responding, or doing the
thing requested. There remain for consideration the effect of
the plaintiff's non-action. When be asked the question whether
defendant would bind or renew the policies and obtained no
answer, what was his duty? Undoubtedly to repeat his question until he obtained an answer. For his request was that
the defendant should make a contract with him and the defendant says nothing. Certainly such silence is not al assent in any
sense. There should be something done or else something said
before it is possible to assume that a contract was established.
There being nothing done and nothing said, there is no footing
upon which an inference of agreement can stand. But what
was the position of the plaintiff? He had asked the defendant
to make a contract with him and the defendant had not agreed
to do so, he had not even answered the question whether he
would do so. The plaintiff knew lie had obtained no answer
but he does not repeat the question. He too is silent thereafter,
and he does not get the thing done which he asks to be done.
Assuredly it was his duty to speak again and to take further
action if he really intended to obtain the defendant's assent. For
what lie wanted was something affirmative and positive and
without it he has no status. But he desists and does and says
nothing further. And so it is that the whole of the plain-
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tiff's case is an unanswered request to the defendant to make a
contract with the plaintiff, and no further attempt by the plaintiff to obtain an answer, and no actual contract made. Out of
such facts it is not possible to make a legal inference of a contract. The other facts proved and offered to be proved, but
rejected improperly as we think, and supposed by each to be
consistent with his theory, tend much more strongly in favor
of the defendant's theory than of the plaintiff's. It is not necessary to discuss them since the other views we have expressed
are fatal to the plaintift's claim.
Nor do I concede that if defendant heard plaintiff's request
and made no answer an inference of assent should be made.
For the hearing of a request and not answering it is as consistent, indeed more consistent, with a dissent than an assent. If
one is asked for alms on the street and hears the request but
'makes no answer it certainly cannot be inferred that lie intended to give them. In the present ease there is no evidence
that defendant heard the plaintiff's request and without hearing
there was of course no duty of speech.
Judgment reversed.
In the principal case, the court say
that the imlosition of contractual relations by mere silence, is exceptional
and of extremely rare occurrence, and
that no perfect instance of the kind
had been mentioned in the argument,
the citations for the defendant in error
havingin them some other element towards establishing the contract, than
mere silence.
IVWarton on Cntracts, 6, was the
first of these citations, the particular
words being,-"Admission by silence,
also, as well as admission by speech,
may have a contractual force, and may
bind as effectually as words." The
author immediately subjoins a reference to another part of his work,
where he has treated of suppression
of a fact, and harmonized all the cases
in the statement that suppression
which estops, is not mere non-action,
but a perversion in telling, which

amounts to a distortion of the truth.

(~217.)
In the principal case the desired
extension of the policy was requested
in so many technical words and no
answer given to the request, so far as
it related to the policy in suit, and
only an inference arose in the mind of
the questioner that the written memoranda made, did relate to all the policies, including the one in suit. The
only perversion which could arise,
would be from a failure to answer the
whole of the question, and the court,
held in effect, that this was no perversion of the truth, because the question might have been repeated until
some answer could be obtained in relation to the Beatty policy. In other
words, mere silence would be ineffectual unless coupled with fraud or
action. This is sustained by the aue
thorities following:
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Wa,. v. Bobbs, L. R. 4 App. C. 13,
in the H. Lds. affirming s. c., L. R. 3
Q. B. D. 150, which reversed s. c., L.
R. 2 Q. B. D. 33 (1878), was a case
where some pigs were sold at public
auction, with express notice that no
warranty would be given and that the
pigs, with all faults and errors, if any,
must be paid for and removed immediately after the sale. Not a word
further was in the case, and the whole
question was one of conduct, which
the purchaser endeavored to convert
into a representation. CAIRNS, Ld.
Chancellor, affirming the unanimous
opinion of the Court of Appeal, held
that there must be something as clear
in statement in an opposite direction
and consequently, no such implication
of a representation could be raised.
Otherwise, in the language of Lord
O'HAGAN, there would be established
a new principle, and the recognition
of a legal presumption heretofore unknown. And this case was expressly
decided in agreement with the principles laid down in Story on Contracts,
643, 644 (5th ed. 1874).
Cogel v. Kniseley, 89 Ill. 598 (1878),
was an omission to call attention to a
patent defect in the bed-plate of a
second-hand steam engine. The seller was truthful in saying that the
engine would do certain work and the
court held that lie was not bound to
know whether, if the patent defect
bad been seen, the sale would have
been made. He was only bound to
see that he did or said nothing to deceive and that he disclosed all latent
defects. To the same effect is Keates
v. Cadogan, 70 Eng. C. L. (10 C. B.)
591 (1851).
Sled v. St.LouisS. & .B. Co., 106 U.
S. 447 (1882), is interesting in connection with the feature of the principal case, that there was no existing
contract at the time the insurance
company was asked to bind the Beatty

policy. 31r. Beatty knew he had no
contract and was asking for one: so
here, the plaintiffs in error attempted
to invoke the principle of estoppel,
applicable to a case where the owner
of real estate stands by and sees improvements erected on his land by
parties believing that they have title
to the land. This salutary principle
was denied to be applicable to the
case in hand, because the parties
making the improvements in this case,
were acquainted with the fact that
they had no title. See also, to the
same effect, Brant v. The Virginia C.
& 1. Co., 93 U. S. 327 (1876) ; s. c.,
16 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 403; Henshaw
v. Bissell, 85 Id. 271 (1873);
. Y.
Rubber Co. v. Rothery, Ct. App. N. Y.
November 28, 1887; &haidt v. Blaul,
Ct. App. Maryland, November 18,
1886; Carpenterv. Osborn, Ct. App.
N. Y. June 15, 1886; Kirk v..Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68 (1879); Simplot v.
Chicago, etc., 1B. .. Co., U. S. C. Ct.,
K. Dist. Iowa, 1883 ; 5 McCreary, 175;
s. c., 16 Fed. Rep. 363.
The preceding authorities are all
cases where the defendant did not act,
as in one aspect of the principal case.
The following reach the same result,
notwithstanding the fact that they
arose from some partial action, as in
the other aspect of the principal case.
Connihan. v. Thompson, 111 Mass.
270 (1873), was an alleged estoppel
from the course of conduct of an
action at law to recover damages for
breach of an agreement to convey
certain land. In prosecuting this
action at law, the plaintiff had attached the land in question as the
property of the vendor, who was
obliged to give bonds with surety
before he could raise money on mortgage of the land. Afterwards, the
plaintiff filed a bill against the vendor,
for specific performance, and the court
held, that the laying of the attach-
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xient in the previous action at law,
and the putting of the vendor to the
trouble of giving bonds, did not estop
the plaintiff from saying that be still
wished to buy the land. The remedies were not inconsistent, though
they were alternative, for they were
both remedies in affirmance of the
contract. To the same effect, though
in pais and not in the conduct of a
lawsuit, see Beaupland v. .JfcK.een, 28
Penna. State R. 124 (1857) ; Baker v.
Iumplhrcy, 101 U. S. 494 (1879).
The effect of silence is further
dwelt upon by Mr. Wharton, in the
same immediate connection by a reference to the implied acceptance of
a proposal, arising from a course of
business established between the
parties. (Q709.) But such an implication will only be of use in elucidating a contract already in existence,
and cannot be introduced to establish
anew contract. (Id.) This is decisive
on the point before the court, for the
Beatty policy was expiring when the
insurance company was requested to
extend it: see the following cases.
This may be illustrated by Flint v.
Johnson, S. Ct. Vt., May 28, 1887,
where one partner put a construction
on the partnership articles which was
known to the other partners, and
having acted upon his construction
without objection, that became the
law of the case. See also, P., IV. &
B. B. B. Co. -v. Dubois, 79 U. S. 47
(1870).
Norttrestera 3. L. I. Co. v. Anerman, S. Ct. Ill., January 23, 1887,
was a case where the insured entered
upon an occupation forbidden by his
policy of life insurance. The company knew of this and regularly demanded the premiums, which were
paid, and receipts given in the usual
form, until the insured's death from
an accident, whilst engaged in the
forbidden occupat:on.
The court

held that the parties were equally
cognizant of the conditions of the
policy and that the payment of the
premiums merely saved the )olicy
from forfeiture from that cause and
did not operate to waive the provision
against the employment. It would
not make a new contract to that
effect.
Bodine v. Killeen, 33 N. Y. 93
(1873), is a type of case which appears to be an exception to the necessity of requiring an explanation or a
reply to a question, before an estoppel
or a contractual relation could arise.
There, a married woman was held to
the appearance which she gave to a
course of dealing, which had continued
through her neglect. She had for
many years, carried on the grocery
business, purchasing from the plaintiffs on credit. Her husband was her
agent until taken sick, when, for a
short time, she made her own purchases. On her husband's rcovery,
she transferred the business to him,
without giving any information of
the change, or the revocation of his
agency. He immediately commenced
to biy from the plaintiffs on credit
and the court held the wife liable for
the bills contracted because she had
given no notice of the change in thie
business. But it is clear that this
will not affect the ruling of the court
in the principal case, because the
liability was not simply the result of
silence on her part, but, even more,
of action on the part of the plaintiffs
which she was bound to stop by a
notice. In the principal case there
was no course of dealing between
Beatty and the insurance company
and the case was not tried on the
theory of a course of dealing between
the agent of Beatty, in respect to
other policies issued by the insurance
company. Such a theory was probably considered untenable. Besides,
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nothing was done by Mir. Beatty, and
the insurance company was not
notified that Mr. Beatty had failed to
reinsure because he understood that
his policy had been renewed.
Cii"sman v. Ltbnt, 2 31. & G. 307
i1S41), is interesting in this connection, as it was cited to the court, in
the principal ease. There, an account
was shown to A. and lie objected to
one of the items but said nothing in
respect to the others. The English
Court of Common Pleas, on a motion
for a new trial, held that such silence
was evidence from which the jury
might infer an account stated and
therefore sustained the verdict for
the amount mentioned in the account.
Mr. Wharton (Contracts, 779) cites
this case, as sustaining the principle
that an implied promise must be in
the form of a specific admission, to
amount to an account stated in the
fiction of the old forms of pleading.
As cited to the court in the principal
case, it was meant to sustain the position that when a number of policies
were offered for extension, and some
altercation occurred over one and
nothing was said about another, that
this other might be considered as extended. But the cases differ: the account was presented, that its items
and total might be admitted and certain steps in pleading eliminated in
the event of a suit. Not so in the
principal case: there the policy of insurance was presented as evidence of
a contract which had expired, but
which was to be made part of the
evidence of a new contract, if d contract was agreed upon. There could
be no doubt of the terms of the new
contract, if made; but the question in
the principal case, was, whether any
new contract had, in fact, been made.
Again, in another view, the items of
the account made one whole, that is,
the account. But the several policies

when bound, made merely several
new contracts and as to admissions inferred from acquiescence, not merely to
questions, but even to statements of
others, the maxim, Qui tmcct coeutie
ridebtu is to be applied with careful
discrimination: 1 Ureenleaf, Ev.
119. That is, when an account is
presented, the whole as well as the
parts, are necessarily before the mind.
When, however, a number of things
are asked for at once, that which is
least discussed, is naturally the least
considered, and a matter barely mentioned, may not be attended to at all,
in the thought of the other policies.
It is reasonable to hold the questioner
to the asking of some question, in
addition, which would secure at least,
a comprehensive, though general
answer.
Again, silence which estop% must
arise from actions which induce the
doing or omitting to do an act, and a
loss ensues. (Wharton, Contr. 6.)
This is illustrated by fraud, which has
been successfully concealed, although
the relations of the parties require
disclosure, as a duty. (Id. 289.)
Devine v. Edwards, 87 Ill. R. 177
(1877), may be taken as an illustration. Milk was sold by the gallon,
but delivered in cans supposed by the
buyer to contain eight gallons each.
On this supposition payments were
made until the buyer finally declared
that he had paid for more milk than
he received and the court allowed
him to recover on proof of the amount
of shortage in the cans. The seller
washeld to see that his cans contained
the full amount, and the buyer was
not held to the exercise of vigilance
such as an ordinarily prudent man
might be expected to use. In the
principal case, there were no relations
existing between the parties, further
than a custom to bind policies upon
request. Relying upon this custom,
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.Mr. Beatty's agent requested the binding of the policies, a.d went away
from the office of the insurance company without receiving any reply.
This is all: there was nothing brought
home to the knowledge of the insurance company whereby they were in
the slightest degree informed that lie
would not apply for any other insurance because of the belief that they
had renewed hispolicy. Suclknowledge and action are essential to an
estoppel, on general principles: Phila.
& Balt. Cent. By. Co.'v. U. S., 103 U.
S. 703 (1880.) So, in the Illinois case
just cited, the weight of the evidence,
contradictory and voluminous as it
might be expected to be, established
that the seller knew that the buyer
was pmaying in the belief of the full
size of the milk cans. This created a
duty to have the cans of full size.
.Fox .ircr Flour and Paper Co. v.
.edly, S. Ct. Wisc., December 13,1887,
further illustrates this particular kind
of silence, which, from the relations of
the parties, required speech to avoid
incurring an obligation ; it was a case
where the principle was confidently
invoked. The plaintiff sought to restrain the diversion of water power,
and the defense was put on the ground
that the power was necessary for the
operation of the defendant's mill;
that the plaintiff knew this and had
stood by in silence, whilst the mill
was being erected, on the raceway by
which water power was furnished
artificially, through adjoining lands.
The court said that.-such water rights
differed from those in water naturally
flowing over land in that they required some grant, actual or presumed,
and that no grant could be presumed
from silence, because it might well be,
that the defendants expected to lease
the power. There was nothing in
the cae to show what water rights
were claimed by the defendants. And

indeed, a threatened invasion of rights
will not necessarily call for action.
Thus, an owner may view in silence
the construction of a work, advancing
towards his land and evidently intended to cross it. When it affects
him, it is time to act: Stewart v.
Stevens, S. Ct. Col., November 18,
18S7. So, in the principal case, Mr.
Beatty did not positively ascertain
what the insurance company would
do with his policy and also did
not communicate to them what he
thought or wished to have done, beyond the mere asking of a question.
The substantial difference, therefore, between preferring a request
and making an assertion, is the resulting effect in the mind of the person speaking: if he is allowed to
labor under a mental deception by
the other party; that is, if the party
keeping silence, perceives not a desire
but an intention to act in a certain
way on the part of the speaker, silence
would be unjust and the speaker must
be put into the expected position.
Thus, where one undertook to purchase a picture and desired to know
to whom it had belonged, the agent
of the seller declined to name the
owner but knew that the buyer believed the picture to have belonged
to A. because the agent had been
selling also for A. The sale. was set
aside, because it had occurred under
v. Gray, 1 Starkie,
a deception: MU7IL
352 (1811).
This substantial difference between
a question and a statement may be
made clearer by considering for a
moment that not even every statement will affect the hearer: thus, a
second moitgagee, though made a
party to the foreclosure of the first
mortgage, is not bound to insist upon
a foreclosure of his mortgage; lie may
remain silent and inactive; lie is
under no moral or legal obligation to
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do anything, for his rights remain
until a dcree is entered against him:
Simmonsv. Taylor, U. S. C. Ct. S.Dist.
Iowa, May12, 1885, 23 Fed. Rep. 855.
So, a mortgagee, immediately after
the execution of his mortgage, heard
the mortgagor state to the justice of
the peace, before whom the instrument had been executed, that it was
without consideration, but nothing
was said to him personally and he
was held not to be required to speak:
Perry v. Dow, 59 Vt. 61. (1887).
That is, the mortgagee was not bound
to interfere in the conversation; see
1 Grnlf. Ev. 197, and citations in
note (c.) i. e., Drury v. Her.ey, 126
Mass. 519 (1879), and Wiitney v.
Hfoughton; per MORTON, J., 127 Id. 527
(1880).
And, conversely, a third
person cannot hold parties to a suit,
liable for his actions, induced by the
testimony in that suit: Hobbs v.
.McLean, 117 U. S. 567 (1885).
From the above review of the
citations for the plaintiff in error, it
is seen, that the contention in the
principal case was altogether to make
out a new contract from the asking
of a question; and necessarily so, for
Mr. Beatty was the actor, and an
estoppel in pais would not have been
useful, as this is merely available for
protection and cannot be a weapon of
assault: per SwAYNF, J., Dickerson v.
Clgrove, 100 U. S. 578 (1879).
The exceptional instances of contracts made without speech, are all
accompanied by action of some kind.
Thus, to enter a railroad car and take
a seat, in silence, is one of Mr. Wharton's own examples, in the section so
This imposes
often quoted. ( 6.)
upon the party the obligation to pay
his fare. It is reciprocal to the obligation of the carrier, who is required
to afford reasonable accommodations
for all who apply for passage, at the
stipulated hire or fare: Angell, CarVOL. XXXVI.-35.

riers, H 524, 525; Thompson, Carriers of Passengers, page 29, 5 (ed.
1880.) (See infra.)
Hence the decision here under annotation, falls within the principle,
that mere inaction eannotbe construed
into an assent. As pointed out by the
court, nothing occurred to put the insurance company on their guard
against the effects of any proposed
action or inaction by Mr. Beatty.
They were simply asked a question
and they did not answer. No contractual relation could arise under
such circumstances, because a proposal must .be definitely assented to,
and mere failure to refuse, is not
enough: Wharton, Contracts,
22.
This is necessarily true, because he
who makes the proposal is himself
not bound by the mere act of proposing, and is under no obligation
whatever, to formally withdraw the
proposal. Being without consideration, it is only anudumpactum: Uoleman
v. Applegarth, Ct. App. Maryland, November 18, 1887; Dickinson v. Dodds,
L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 463 (1876); Story,
Contracts, 495. Perhaps this will
appear more distinct after a moment's
reflection upon the instance of a passenger taking a seat in a railway car:
supra. His light to do so and
thereby assume the reciprocal obligation of paying his fare, arise from the
law, which compels all in public employment, such as common carriers,
to keep up a constant though reasonable, offer to contract to perform their
public duties; e.g., carry a passenger's
personal baggage with the passenger,
although no contract has been formally entered into at the time when
the transportation of the passenger
begins: Hannibal, etc., B. B. C. v.
Swift, 79 U. S. 262 (1870.)
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